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1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici are law professors who focus on LGBT
rights and antidiscrimination law in their scholarship
and/or teaching. Kyle Velte is the author of several law
review articles about the issues presented in this case,
including a forthcoming article on which this brief is
based.2
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
For 150 years, our country has grappled with the
tension between its commitment to antidiscrimination principles, grounded in the Reconstruction
Amendments, and its commitment to religious liberty,

1

Respondents have filed blanket consents to the filing of
amicus briefs. Amici requested and received consent from Petitioners and Intervenors. Counsel for a party has not authored the
brief in whole or in part; nor has such counsel or a party made a
monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of the brief.
2
See Kyle C. Velte, Restoring the Race Analogy in LGBT Religious Exemption Cases, 42 CARDOZO L. REV. ___ (forthcoming
2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3549952;
see also Kyle C. Velte, Why the Religious Right Can’t Have Its
(Straight Wedding) Cake and Eat It Too: Breaking the Preservation-Through-Transformation Dynamic in Masterpiece Cakeshop
v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 36 L. & INEQ. 67 (2018);
Kyle C. Velte, Fueling the Terrorist Fires with the First Amendment: Religious Freedom, the Anti-LGBT Right, and Interest Convergence Theory, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1109 (2017); Kyle C. Velte,
All Fall Down: A Comprehensive Approach to Defeating the Religious Right’s Challenge to Anti-Discrimination Statutes, 49 CONN.
L. REV. 1 (2016).

2
grounded in the First Amendment.3 The national
reckoning with requests for religious exemptions from
antidiscrimination laws concerning race is now settled.
From those legal battles emerged “time-tested, reasonable, and workable”4 balances. But this Court has not
yet settled how religiously-grounded requests for exemptions from antidiscrimination laws concerning
sexual orientation apply to those laws, as this Court’s
treatment of sexual orientation under the Constitution, like those antidiscrimination laws themselves,
are of recent vintage. Yet, this Court’s prior resolution
of claims for religious exemptions from race antidiscrimination laws provide this Court a “reasonable, and
workable” resolution of claims for religious exemptions
from sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws.
This brief explains how this Court’s treatment of
race guides it to fashion the best decision—one that
avoids normative critiques of who is supposedly virtuous or prejudiced. Constitutional law has no business
singling out and assessing the normative or moral
worthiness of religious beliefs vis-à-vis objections to
antidiscrimination law if it does not also assess the
normative or moral worthiness of other, non-religious
objections to antidiscrimination law. Moreover, this
3

See Carlos A. Ball, Against LGBT Exceptionalism in Religious Exemptions from Antidiscrimination Obligations, 31 J. C.R.
& ECON. DEV. 233, 237–38 (2018); see also Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018);
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623–24 (1984); Newman v.
Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968) (per curiam).
4
Ball, supra note 3, at 238.

3
Court’s teachings in cases about reconciling free exercise with antidiscrimination principles vis-à-vis race
should lead to a harmonious, stable, and consistent
doctrinal framework.
The Court’s recent teachings in this vein provide
an analytic framework for this case. Here, Philadelphia’s Catholic Social Services (“CSS”) claims a religious exemption from the Philadelphia Fair Practices
Ordinance (“FPO”), which requires social service
agencies contracting with it to serve adopting couples
without discrimination, including same-sex couples. In
Masterpiece Cakeshop,5 this Court left open the question of whether an analogy to race is appropriate in religious exemption cases involving sexual orientation.
The race analogy in sexual orientation cases proceeds
as follows: advocates and judges widely agree that
courts should, and would, reject a religious exemption
claim by a public accommodation—such as a wedding
vendor or, as here, a foster care agency—seeking to
turn away an African-American or interracial couple
based on the public accommodation’s religious beliefs
that Blacks are inferior to whites or that the races
should not mix.6 Analogizing to race means that courts
should likewise reject CSS’s religious exemption
5

138 S. Ct. at 1732 (reversing on the basis that the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission’s treatment of baker was inconsistent
with the neutrality the Free Exercise Clause requires).
6
See Transcript of Oral argument at 21:16–22:9, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111) [hereinafter Transcript].
By citing Piggie Park in the majority decision, the Court suggests
that the race analogy is proper in sexual orientation religious exemption cases. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727.

4
claims seeking to turn away same-sex couples based on
their religious beliefs about marriage.
Masterpiece Cakeshop cited this Court’s 1968 decision in Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc.,7 thus
applying the race analogy to sexual orientation cases.8
In the context of resolving the question of the proper
standard for an award of attorneys’ fees under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Piggie Park affirmed the lower
courts’ rejection of a religious exemption claim in the
context of race discrimination.9 Because today’s exemption seekers make similar claims vis-à-vis sexual
orientation discrimination, LGBT-rights advocates argue that Piggie Park resolves the question of religious
exemptions against exemption seekers.
Yet today’s exemption seekers reject use of the
race analogy and the applicability of Piggie Park for at
least two reasons. The first is based on a normative argument: The vendors of the 1960s who relied on their
religious beliefs to discriminate based on race were
racists, whereas today’s exemption seekers are people
of faith asserting honorable and sincere religious beliefs. Because they are not bigots and the long-ago
vendors in Piggie Park were, they argue that the race
analogy must fail. Otherwise, they contend, today’s

7
8
9

390 U.S. 400 (1968).
138 S. Ct. at 1727.
390 U.S. at 402 n.5.

5
exemption seekers will be unfairly branded as bigots.10
Second, today’s exemption seekers contend that the
race analogy fails because race discrimination receives
strict scrutiny, whereas this Court has not applied that
standard to sexual orientation discrimination.11
These objections to the race analogy fail as a matter of historical and contemporary fact, and as a matter
of law. The first objection fails because the race analogy
and the honorableness of today’s exemption seekers
are not mutually exclusive. Opposition to religious exemptions need not entail any argument that exemption seekers are acting dishonorably or with animus,
nor rest on the doctrine of Romer v. Evans12 or United
States v. Windsor,13 which struck down laws because
they rested on anti-LGBT animus. To understand why
the race analogy need not be a normative rebuke to
today’s exemption seekers, it is important to reappraise the relevant legal and factual premises. Below,
amici frame this dispute constructively and neutrally,
arguing that (1) exemption seekers’ First Amendment
claims fail as a matter of well-established law, regardless of the normative characterization of the asserted

10

See LINDA C. MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT?: LEARNING
CONFLICTS OVER MARRIAGE AND CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 3 (2020)
[hereinafter MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT?].
11
The Court’s recent decision in Bostock v. Clayton County,
140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), strongly suggests that sexual orientation
merits intermediate scrutiny, as does sex discrimination. See infra Part II.
12
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
13
570 U.S. 744 (2013).
FROM

6
religious beliefs, and not because of anything normatively flawed about them; (2) the exemption seekers of
the 1960s were viewed as honorable and sincere by
courts and the public alike; and (3) courts must not
look behind the asserted religious belief to validate or
critique it, but must instead accept the asserted belief
at face value.
From these premises, the normative characterization of the asserted religious belief—whether as animusdriven and framed as prejudiced, or as honorable as
validating important and worthy norms—is irrelevant
when assessing the propriety of the race analogy. Instead, the correct constitutional analysis begins with
the premise that exemption seekers like CSS need not
be viewed as inflected with animus or bigotry and
that the race analogy and Piggie Park are properly
used to analyze their claims. Similarly, the second objection—concerning strict scrutiny—fails because it is
based on a fundamental misunderstanding of two
things that are not commensurate: the relationship
between the equal protection tiers of scrutiny, on one
hand, and claims for religious exemptions from antidiscrimination law, on the other. Revealing these conceptual traps allows this Court to develop sounder and
more coherent and consistent doctrine.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

ARGUMENT
Supporters of today’s religious exemptions seekers
argue that race is different from sexual orientation,

7
rendering the race analogy and Piggie Park inapposite.14 Their two central arguments against the race
analogy fail, as explained below.
Piggie Park Is Analogous: Honorable Opposition v. Explicit Bigotry

I.

A. Newman v. Piggie Park
Piggie Park is at the heart of the dispute over the
race analogy in the sexual orientation discrimination
religious exemption cases. In 1964, soon after the Civil
Rights Act (CRA) became law, African-Americans in
South Carolina brought a class action alleging that the
Piggie Park chain of BBQ restaurants refused them
service on the same terms as white customers.15 The
defendants—the corporate entity of Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., and its principal shareholder and manager,
14

See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and
Religious-Liberty Claims Have in Common, 5 Nw. J.L. & SOC.
POL’Y 206, 235 (2010); Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General
Motors: Implications for Interjurisdictional Recognition of NonTraditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 147, 151–52 (1998);
Robert H. Bork, The Judge’s Role in Law and Culture, 1 AVE MARIA L. Rev. 19, 26 (2003); David Orgon Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card: Same-Sex Marriage and the Politics of Analogy, 12 BYU
J. Pub. L. 201, 204 (1998); Dale M. Schowengerdt, Note, Defending Marriage: A Litigation Strategy to Oppose Same-Sex “Marriage”, 14 REGENT U.L. REV. 487, 491–92 (2002); Lynn D. Wardle,
A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 75–82 (1996); see also Transcript, supra note 6, at 31:23–33:11.
15
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 256 F. Supp. 941,
943–44 (D.S.C. 1966), rev’d, 377 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967), aff ’d,
390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).

8
Maurice Bessinger—argued that they were exempt
from complying with the CRA because it violated Bessinger’s First Amendment right to freedom of religion
because his faith “ ‘compel[led] him to oppose any integration of the races whatever.’ ”16 In a four-paragraph
per curiam decision, this Court rejected a subjective
standard for attorney fees under the CRA.17 In a footnote, the Court noted that, on remand, an award of attorney fees to the plaintiffs would be proper: “Indeed,
this is not . . . even a borderline case, for the respondents interposed defenses so patently frivolous that a
denial of counsel fees to the petitioners would be manifestly inequitable.”18 The Court pointed to the defendants’ argument that the CRA “was invalid because it
‘contravenes the will of God’ and constitutes an interference with the ‘free exercise of the Defendant’s religion’ ” as an example of a “patently frivolous” defense
properly subject to an award of attorney fees.19
B. Piggie Park Applies to Today’s Religious
Exemption Cases
Today’s exemption seekers argue what while the
religious argument asserted in Piggie Park was
deemed “frivolous,”20 the religious beliefs of public
16

Id.at 944.
Piggie Park, 390 U.S. at 401.
18
Id. at 402 n.5.
19
Id. (quoting Piggie Park, 377 F.2d 433 at 437–38 (Winter,
J., concurring)).
20
Piggie Park, 377 F.2d at 437 (Winters, J., concurring).
17

9
accommodation such as CSS are just the opposite—
sincerely held.21 At the Masterpiece Cakeshop oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts addressed this particular concern:
[T]he racial analogy obviously is very compelling, but when the Court upheld same-sex
marriage in Obergefell, it went out of its way
to talk about the decent and honorable people
who may have opposing views.
And to immediately lump them in the same
group as people who are opposed to equality
in relations with respect to race, I’m not sure
that takes full account of that—of that concept in the Obergefell decision.22
Today’s exemption seekers understandably seek
to elevate this concern into an analytic frame that can
avoid the race analogy. They scaffold their distinction
of Piggie Park with language from Obergefell: “Many
who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that
conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or
philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here.”23 Overlaying this language
21

See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Christian Business Owners Supporting Religious Freedom in Support of Petitioners at
30–31, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138
S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4005666, at *30–31; see
also MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT?, supra note 10, at 196–98;
Douglas NeJaime, Bigotry in Time: Race, Sexual Orientation, and
Gender, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2651, 2655 (2019).
22
Transcript, supra note 6, 75:17-76:5.–74:3.
23
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015); see
also Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars:

10
from Obergefell upon the distinction they argue from
Piggie Park’s “patently frivolous” finding, today’s exemption seekers argue that it is unfair and offensive
to compare them to the racist vendors who claimed religious exemptions from the CRA.24 They insist that
“race is different . . . because essentially all religious
actors who believe it is proper to make racial distinctions always act in bad faith (i.e., they are racists). On
the other hand, it is argued, many of those who, on conscience grounds, believe it is proper to make distinctions on the basis of sexual orientation, in particular
when it comes to marriage, act in good faith (i.e., they
are not homophobic).”25
Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124
YALE L.J. 2516, 2558–66 (2015).
24
See, e.g., Ryan T. Anderson, Disagreement Is Not Always
Discrimination: Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Analogy to Interracial Marriage, 16 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 123, 134 (2018);
Linda C. McClain, The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and “Legislating
Morality”: On Conscience, Prejudice, and Whether “Stateways”
can Change “Folkways,” 95 B.U. L. REV. 891, 894–95 (2015) [hereinafter McClain, Stateways].
25
Ball, supra note 3, at 239–40. For example, Robin Wilson
contends that “[t]he religious and moral convictions that motivate
objectors to refuse to facilitate same-sex marriage simply cannot
be marshaled to justify racial discrimination.” Robin Fretwell
Wilson, Matters of Conscience: Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage
from the Healthcare Context in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 101 (Douglas Laycock et al.
eds., 2008). Lynn Wardle and Lincoln Oliphant contend that accepting the race analogy “means that those who oppose same-sex
marriage are, like those who opposed inter-racial marriage,
simply bigots.” Lynn D. Wardle & Lincoln C. Oliphant, In Praise
of Loving: Reflections on the “Loving Analogy” for Same-Sex
Marriage, 51 HOW. L.J. 117, 151 (2007).

11
While the exemption seekers understandably disclaim animus, they seek to elevate these normative distinctions grounded in subjective moral judgments to a
legal principle that excludes use of the race analogy.
Deeper analysis of the bigoted versus honorable distinction, however, disrupts any potential persuasive
work that might be accomplished with the exemption
seekers’ argument.
As an initial matter, it is important to address the
exemption seekers’ reliance on the Court’s statement
in Obergefell; considering that statement in context
weakens its power as scaffolding. That portion of the
opinion was immediately followed by another, contrasting statement that privileges and respects a different, pro-equality view: “But when that sincere,
personal opposition becomes enacted law and public
policy, the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then
denied.”26
1. The Exemption Seekers of the 1960s
Were Not Considered Fringe or Prejudiced
The distinction between “bigoted” and “honorable”
citizens in this context is simplistic and wrong as a
matter of historical fact regarding how American

26

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
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society viewed these questions 50 years ago.27 Opponents of the CRA made religiously-grounded arguments similar to the arguments of today’s exemption
seekers; moreover, their reliance on their faith was
mainstream, not fringe.28 Importantly, similar to today’s exemption seekers, the religious objectors to the
CRA bristled when they were characterized as bigots;
they, too, considered their religiously-based opposition
to the CRA honorable, right, and just.29 As Michael
Kent Curtis notes:
Slavery, racial discrimination and segregation, and opposition to women’s rights were
all supported by strong religious arguments
bolstered by citations to the Bible. As scholarly
work has shown, these religious views were
deeply held by many people. That Professor
[Robin Fretwell] Wilson finds it impossible to
marshal religious arguments for segregation
is, to a great degree, a tribute to the success of
the Civil Rights Movement and civil rights
laws, generally without exemptions for religious objectors.
27

See Shannon Gilreath & Arley Ward, Same-Sex Marriage,
Religious Accommodation, and the Race Analogy, 41 VT. L. REV.
237, 261, 278 (2016).
28
MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT?, supra note 10, at 105, 126.
29
McClain, Stateways, supra note 24, at 894–95; MCCLAIN,
WHO’S THE BIGOT?, supra note 10, at 8, 117; Randall Kennedy,
Marriage and the Struggle for Gay, Lesbian, and Black Liberation, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 781, 791 (2005); James M. Oleske, Jr.,
The Evolution of Accommodations: Comparing the Unequal Treatment of Religious Objections to Interracial and Same-Sex Marriages, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 107–08 (2015).
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Not only could religious arguments for segregation be marshaled, they were marshaled.30
It was not just clergy who opposed integration on religious grounds; leading Senators from both sides of the
aisle, including Robert Byrd and Strom Thurmond
made such arguments on the Senate floor and their
sentiments were shared by “educators, ‘housewives,
sorority sisters, and Rotarians. . . .’ ”31 In 1963, thenPresident Truman stated that “he did not believe white
persons should marry Negroes . . . [and] that racial
intermarriage ran counter to teachings of the Bible.”32
Fairly understood, the 1960s exemption seekers
espoused views which, though viewed by most people
today as offensive, were endorsed by leaders of both
major political parties, and which enjoyed a regrettable breadth of acceptance and respect that Americans
today might prefer to forget.33 The “complete lack of . . .
deference” given to opponents of interracial marriage
in the 1960s and the relatively greater deference given
30

Michael Kent Curtis, A Unique Religious Exemption from
Antidiscrimination Laws in the Case of Gays? Putting the Call for
Those Who Discriminate Against Married or Marrying Gays in
Context, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 187–88 (2012) (citations
omitted); see also MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT?, supra note 10, at
126, 203.
31
Gilreath & Ward, supra note 27, at 262 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
32
Oleske, supra note 29, at 100 (quoting Truman Opposes
Biracial Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1963, p. 30).
33
See MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT?, supra note 10, at 126
(noting that “religious beliefs about segregation were not ‘fringe’
in the mid-1960s and were sincerely and widely held”).
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to today’s objectors to same-sex marriage “cannot be
explained by the extent of contemporary societal support of the respective practices.”34 Thus, those who in
the 1960s opposed racial equality and integration “are
entitled to the same presumption of sincerity as current opponents of gay equality. Many believed the religious argument against integration and interracial
marriage, just as many people believe the religious arguments against gay equality and liberty.”35
2. Courts Need Not Assess the Normative Character of Religious Beliefs
Both opponents of the CRA in the 1960s and today’s exemption seekers ground their positions in the
34

Olekse, supra note 29, at 102, 107 (“According to Gallup,
public support of interracial marriage in the 1950s and 1960s
was considerably lower than support for same-sex marriage in
the 1990s and 2000s.”) (citing Jeffrey M. Jones, Record-High 86%
Approve of Black-White Marriages, GALLUP (Sept. 12, 2011),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/149390/record-high-approve-blackwhite-marriages.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/HN22-D5J2
(reporting that public approval of interracial marriage was at just
4% in 1958 and 20% in 1968), in comparison with Frank Newport,
For First Time, Majority of Americans Favor Legal Gay Marriage,
GALLUP (May 20, 2011), http:// www.gallup.com/poll/147662/firsttime-majority-americans-favor-legal-gay-marriage.aspx, archived
at http://perma.cc/Y533-7CNC (reporting that support for samesex marriage was 27% in 1996, 42% in 2004, and 53% in 2011)).
35
Curtis, supra note 30, at 191–92; see also Ball, supra note
3, at 241–42; Margaret M. Russell, Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual
Rights and “The Civil Rights Agenda”, 1 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP.
33, 44 (1994); Mark Strasser, Public Policy, Same-Sex Marriage,
and Exemptions for Matters of Conscience, 12 FLA. COASTAL L.
REV. 135, 139–40 (2010).
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same source: their faith.36 The normative characterizations of exemption seekers’ reasons for seeking a religious exemption, whether cast as prejudiced or
honorable, is inconsequential because courts often take
at face value sincerely held religious beliefs, and do so
without attaching normative judgments as to whether
the asserted belief is “prejudiced” or “honorable.”37
This approach is correct on many levels. As a normative, pragmatic matter, such determinations are
beyond judicial competence, thus rendering courts “illequipped” to make such inquiries.38 And as a legal
matter, courts decline to look behind a sincerely held
religious belief.39 As a result, “courts have been reluctant to interpret theologies . . . because [they] lack
competence on such matters and because they must
guarantee government neutrality with respect to religions.”40 Simply put, “[c]ourts are not arbiters of

36

See Curtis, supra note 30, at 178; Kennedy, supra note 29,
at 783; McClain, Stateways, supra note 24, at 916–18.
37
See Paul Baker, Note, Religious Exemptions and the Vocational Dimension of Work, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 171 (2019).
38
Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s HandsOff Approach to Questions of Religious Practice and Belief, 25
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 85, 86 (1997) (citation omitted).
39
Id. at 86 n.3 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263
n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring) and County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 678 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) and Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery, 485
U.S. 439, 457–58 (1987)).
40
Nelson Tebbe, Reply: Conscience and Equality, 31 J. C.R.
& ECON. DEV. 1, 33 (2018).
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scriptural interpretation.”41 This has been true in religious exemption cases involving sexual orientation
discrimination as well as cases involving race-based
discrimination.42
It would be problematic to try to distinguish between religious grounds for a sexual orientation exemption and one for a racial exemption because
attempts to make those distinctions “contain unavoidable assessments of the reasonableness of the two sets
of religious views.”43 Attempts to distinguish between
these two positions “fail from the beginning because
they are grounded in the notion that some religious
views are more reasonable than others.”44
This “reluctance of courts to second guess an individual’s religious beliefs”45 shows the strength of the
race analogy because it insulates the religious beliefs
of exemption seekers from normative characterization
by the law as either “prejudiced” or “honorable.”46 Because courts must not look behind the “correctness” of
sincerely held asserted religious beliefs, they must
likewise reject the claim by exemption seekers that
courts can classify religious beliefs as “honorable” or
41

Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Emp’t Sec. Div., 450
U.S. 707, 716 (1981).
42
See MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT?, supra note 10, at 188.
43
Ball, supra note 3, at 240.
44
Id. at 241.
45
Baker, supra note 37, at 199.
46
See MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT?, supra note 10, at 196 (“A
court does not inquire into whether such sincere religious beliefs
are reasonable or mistaken.”).
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“bigoted,” and then make substantive determinations
on claims for religious exemptions based on such impermissible normative characterizations. Today’s exemption seekers would improperly “require[ ] the state
to leave its perch of neutrality among religions because
the position involves an assessment of which claims
of conscience are correct.”47 As such, “the suggestion
that the same [religiously-based] arguments cannot
be offered against recognizing the different kinds of
marriages [interracial or same-sex] is at best irrelevant.”48
Thus, even if it is factually true that public accommodation like CSS “who turn their backs on same sex
marriage on religious grounds have no evil in their
hearts, in the overwhelming majority of cases,”49 that
fact would not be relevant given the plain language of
the FPO proscribing discriminatory conduct based on
race or sexual orientation without any hierarchy.50
Thus, the debate over the intentions of today’s exemption seekers is a detour from the merits of the legal
questions and a distraction from meaningful consideration of the race analogy and the applicability of Piggie
Park.

47

Id.
Id.; see also Strasser, supra note 35, at 141.
49
Lawrence G. Sager & Nelson Tebbe, The Reality Principle,
34 CONST. COMMENT. 171, 189 (2019).
50
MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT?, supra note 10, at 190. Notably, the FPO regulates only conduct, not belief.
48
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Indeed, this Court’s obligation to accept CSS’s religious beliefs without judgments as to their correctness or reasonableness defeats arguments that Piggie
Park is distinguishable. When this Court agreed with
the lower court’s description of the BBQ joint owner’s
defense based on his religious belief as “patently frivolous,”51 it was not making a normative judgment about
the content of that belief.52 That type of moral and normative characterization of a litigant’s religious belief
is outside the competence of judges and unconstitutional under the First Amendment. This Court might
have been commenting on the notion that a business
entity could hold a religious belief, something foreign
to 1960s Free Exercise jurisprudence,53 but which has
recently been recognized by this Court in Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,54 under which “courts would
be compelled to entertain the [BBQ] chain’s claim for
exemption.”55 Or the Court might well have been commenting that a religious objection as a defense to the
nondiscrimination law challenged there was patently
frivolous. In any event, neither the Fourth Circuit nor
this Court expressed a judgment about the correctness
of the religious belief in Piggie Park. As such, Piggie
51

Piggie Park, 377 F.2d at 437 (Winter, J., concurring).
See Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 1453, 1517 (2015) [hereinafter Sepper, Lochnerism].
53
See id.
54
573 U.S. 682, 707 (2014).
55
Sepper, Lochnerism, supra note 52, at 1517; see also Elizabeth Sepper, Gays in the Moralized Marketplace, 7 ALA. C.R. &
C.L. L. REV. 129, 130, 133–36 (2015) (citing Piggie Park, 390 U.S.
at 402 n.5 and United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)).
52
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Park cannot be distinguished as involving an incorrect
or improper religious belief, and clearly not by a litigant making the constitutionally irrelevant argument
that its religious belief is more virtuous than other beliefs to which it could be compared.
Accordingly, while today’s exemption seekers may
“bristle at the notion that religiously-based resistance
to racial integration is of any relevance to present-day
controversies[,]”56 whether they are similar or dissimilar to the opponents of the CRA in the 1960s is irrelevant. The fact that both groups base their claims on
religious beliefs is the relevant comparison, making
Piggie Park and the race analogy applicable here, as
Masterpiece Cakeshop recognized.57 It is thus important to emphasize that “the mere step of drawing
analogies between past and present forms of discrimination to point out how, over time, new insights and
evolving understandings have led to recognition that
such treatment is unjustified”—as is done when citing
Piggie Park in this case—“is not a charge of bigotry.”58
It is equally important to stress that when the City of
Philadelphia compares the religious exemption sought
here by CSS to race discrimination, this comparison
should be not be treated as shorthand for anti-religion

56

McClain, Stateways, supra note 24, at 925.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727.
58
MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT?, supra note 10, at 209; see
also id. at 201 (“[O]ne can concede religious sincerity while upholding the legitimacy of state anti-discrimination laws.”).
57
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hostility by the City—a point the Court’s citation to
Piggie Park in Masterpiece Cakeshop underscores.59
II.

Equal Protection Tiers of Scrutiny are Irrelevant to the Question of Religious Exemptions from Antidiscrimination Laws

Although the sexual orientation religious exemption cases involve statutory protections, today’s exemption seekers invoke the constitutional tiers of scrutiny
to try to persuade courts to reject the race analogy. For
example, in briefs and argument in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, the baker and his amici supported their
general argument that race differs from sexual orientation by arguing that race receives strict scrutiny
while sexual orientation receives rational basis review.60 Counsel for the baker made a similar claim at
59

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1727 (“[W]hile . . . religious and philosophical objections are protected, it is a general
rule that such objections do not allow business owners and other
actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons
equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally
applicable public accommodations law.”).
60
See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 15, Masterpiece Cakeshop
v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111),
2017 WL 5644420, at *15; Transcript, supra note 6, at 20:8–21:20,
22:1–23:6; see also Brief for Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law, Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Center for Constitutional Rights, Color of Change, the Leadership
Conference of Civil and Human Rights, National Action Network,
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, National Urban League and Southern Poverty Law Center as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 18, Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16111), 2017 WL 5127306, at *18 [hereinafter Brief for Lawyers’
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the Masterpiece Cakeshop oral argument.61 Similarly,
scholars supporting religious exemptions contend
that the race analogy improperly compares “apples
and oranges”—the notion that the racial civil rights
movement, which arose from slavery, is simply not

Committee for Civil Rights Under Law]. The United States, appearing as amici in support of the baker, argued that “laws targeting race-based discrimination may survive heightened First
Amendment scrutiny” because “a State’s ‘fundamental, overriding interest’ in eliminating private racial discrimination . . . may
justify even those applications of a public accommodation law
that infringe on First Amendment freedoms.” Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 32, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 4004530, at *32 (citation omitted).
The United States then argued that that same public accommodation law should face a different fate when sexual orientation
discrimination is at issue: “The Court has not similarly held that
classifications based on sexual orientation are subject to strict
scrutiny or that eradicating private individuals’ opposition to
same-sex marriage is a uniquely compelling interest.” Id.
61
In response to Justice Kagan’s question, “[s]ame case or
not the same case, if your client instead objected to an interracial
marriage?”, counsel for the baker responded: “I think race is different for two reasons: one, we know that that objection would be
based to who the person is, rather than what the message is. And,
second, even if that were not the case, the Court could find a compelling interest in the race inquiry. . . .” Transcript, supra note 6,
at 22:1–23:6. In response to Justice Sotomayor’s question, “is your
theory that . . . public accommodation laws cannot trump free
speech or free-exercise claims in protecting against race discrimination?”, the baker’s attorney responded: “That is not my theory.
That would be an objection to the person and the Court may find
a compelling interest in that.” Id. at 21:12–20. These references
to a compelling interest are, of course, references to the argument
that race gets strict scrutiny and, according to the argument, sexual orientation does not.
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comparable to the LGBT-rights movement, as illustrated by what they contend are differing levels of
equal protection scrutiny.62
Significantly, this Court has not yet determined
the level of equal protection scrutiny afforded to sexual
orientation, although its recent decision in Bostock v.
Clayton County suggests that sexual orientation, like
sex, is subject to intermediate scrutiny.63 Moreover, the
Ninth Circuit and Second Circuit have held that sexual orientation is subject to heightened scrutiny.64 Yet
putting all of that aside, Petitioners’ argument nonetheless fails.
As an initial matter, this argument is out of place
where the statute at issue—a public accommodation
law—does not classify based on race, or on any protected classification. The law declares that the prohibited conduct—discrimination in the marketplace—is
prohibited vis-à-vis all protected individuals (race, sex,
religion, sexual orientation, etc.); it is a neutral law of
general applicability that even-handedly applies to all
places of public accommodation. Moreover, CSS does
not challenge the FPO under the Equal Protection
Clause, the provision most readily associated with the

62

Wardle & Oliphant, supra note 25, at 144–45.
See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1778 (Alito, J., dissenting).
64
E.g., Karnoski v. Trump, 926 F.3d 1180, 1200–01 (9th Cir.
2019); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 468 (9th Cir. 2014);
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs, 740 F.3d 471, 480–81
(9th Cir. 2014); Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 180–85
(2d Cir. 2012), aff ’d, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
63
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argument that “race gets strict scrutiny, but sexual orientation gets rational basis.”
Exemption seekers’ arguments on this front take
two forms. First, because they contend sexual orientation should be subject to rational basis review,65 cities
like Philadelphia do not have a compelling interest in
protecting against sexual orientation discrimination in
the marketplace. In contrast, the argument proceeds,
because race gets strict scrutiny, cities like Philadelphia do have a compelling interest in protecting
against racial discrimination in the marketplace.66
This argument turns antidiscrimination law on its
head and contradicts this Court’s precedent declaring
that protecting against discrimination in public accommodation is a compelling state interest.67 As a result,
when a statute’s plain language declares that both race
and sexual orientation are deserving of the protection
of a public accommodation law, there is necessarily a
compelling state interest in supporting every application of the antidiscrimination statute.

65

But see Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1743 (holding that sexual
orientation discrimination is sex discrimination under Title VII);
id. at 1783 (Alito, J., dissenting); Karnoski, 926 F.3d at 1200–01;
Latta, 771 F.3d at 468; SmithKline Beecham Corp., 740 F.3d at
480–81; Windsor, 99 F.3d at 180–85.
66
See Wardle & Oliphant, supra note 25, at 144–45.
67
See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 624 (noting that “eliminating discrimination and assuring its citizens equal access to publicly
available goods and services . . . plainly serves compelling state
interests of the highest order.”).
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Masterpiece Cakeshop suggests that exemption
seekers’ argument concerning the level of scrutiny
should not carry the day. The Court wrote that it was
“unexceptional” that states can protect LGBT people
through public accommodation law, as Colorado did
there.68 The Court’s “matter-of-fact” assessment of
state antidiscrimination laws “is an important implicit rejection of . . . the argument that . . . the state’s
interest in prohibiting race discrimination is far more
compelling then addressing other forms of discrimination[,]” such as sexual orientation discrimination.69
Moreover, Bostock’s holding that sexual orientation discrimination is per se sex discrimination under
Title VII70 has “far-reaching consequences” that spill
over into constitutional law.71 Sex-based discrimination is subject to intermediate scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause.72 Thus, “[b]y equating discrimination because of sexual orientation or gender
identity with discrimination because of sex, the Court’s
decision will be cited as a ground for subjecting all
three forms of discrimination to the same exacting
68

138 S. Ct. at 1728.
MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT?, supra note 10, at 207; see
also Romer, 517 U.S. at 627–28 (noting with approval “modern
anti-discrimination laws” that “go[ ] well beyond the entities covered by the common law” by “enumerating the groups or persons
within their ambit of protection”—such as LGBT people—“to
make the duty not to discriminate concrete and to provide guidance for those who must comply.”).
70
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1742.
71
Id. at 1778 (Alito, J., dissenting).
72
See, e.g., U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–34 (1996).
69
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standard of review.”73 The consequence of having the
same Equal Protection standard for sexual orientation
and sex defeats exemption seekers’ argument that race
is inapposite because race gets strict scrutiny while
sexual orientation only gets rational basis review.
In fact, in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the
Court held that a public accommodation law that protected against sex discrimination served a compelling
state interest, even though sex-based classifications
received only intermediate constitutional scrutiny.74
After Bostock, that same conclusion should result with
regard to public accommodation laws that protect
against sexual orientation discrimination. Moreover,
the Court has suggested that a state legislature had
the authority to serve its interest in prohibiting sexual
orientation discrimination in public accommodation
law,75 even if sexual orientation received only rational
basis—or, more likely after Bostock, intermediate scrutiny—in equal protection inquiries. Thus, to accept the
exemption seekers’ argument about strict scrutiny—to
analyze religious exemption claims differently depending on the individual relying on statutory protection
based on an equal protection doctrine that is not implicated—is to defy the Court’s declaration that public
accommodation laws serve compelling government

73

Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1783 (Alito, J., dissenting).
See Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 623.
75
See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of
Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995).
74
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interests, even where classes that do not receive strict
scrutiny under equal protection are at issue.76
A second variation of this argument appears to be
that the First Amendment claims being made by the
exemption seekers requires strict scrutiny. That fact,
coupled with the fact that race receives strict scrutiny,
is urged as support for the argument that “race is just
different.”77 Thus, the argument seems to be that because the free exercise claims and race both get strict
scrutiny, the public accommodation law is not narrowly
tailored in a way to survive the double strict scrutiny
inquiry.78 However, because public accommodation
laws are neutral laws of general applicability, they
generally are considered under the rational basis test
rather than the strict scrutiny test when challenged
under the First Amendment.79 Indeed, when the Court
76

See generally Brief for Lawyers’ Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law, supra note 60, at *18–19; Deborah A. Widiss,
Intimate Liberties and Antidiscrimination Law, 97 B.U. L. REV.
2083, 2128 (2017) (“The assumption that protection against
marital status discrimination is less compelling than protection
against discrimination on the basis of race or sex is deeply problematic.”).
77
See Brief for Freedom of Speech Scholars as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 16 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo.
Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), 2017
WL 4876116, *16.
78
See id.
79
See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879
(1990); see Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. in Support of Respondents, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719
(2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 5127302 [hereinafter Brief of
NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund].
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has “considered and rejected religious exemptions in
the past, those precedents are not limited to the context of racial discrimination simply because they originally arose in that context.”80
In sum, these arguments seeking to treat exemption claims against various antidiscrimination statutes as receiving radically different constitutional
analyses are flawed. The arguments conflate a government’s compelling interest to combat discrimination in
public accommodation with the level of scrutiny that
applies in an equal protection claim.81 It is therefore
“irrelevant whether government-sponsored sexual orientation discrimination receives the same scrutiny as
government-sponsored racial discrimination.”82 That is
because the state interest in preventing discrimination
is the appropriate interest to consider in evaluating
any constitutional challenge to a public accommodation law, rather than the constitutional scrutiny that is
afforded to governmental discrimination against those
groups protected by the public accommodation law.83

80

Brief of NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, supra
note 79, at 16.
81
See id. at 19; accord David B. Cruz, Piety and Prejudice:
Free Exercise Exemption from Laws Prohibiting Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1176, 1186–89 & n.63
(1994).
82
Brief for Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law,
supra note 60, at 19.
83
Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, supra note 79, at *16-*19 and n.18.
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III. The Race Analogy Is Useful in Resolving
This Case
This Court can and should rely on the race analogy
in resolving this case, but without recourse to distracting invocations of whether a religious belief is “honorable” or grounded in “animus” because courts do not
normatively interrogate religious beliefs before determining the applicability of antidiscrimination statutes. Proceeding from this understanding, the plain
language of the FPO (and similar state public accommodation laws) make the analogy to race and to
Piggie Park appropriate, as this Court recognized in
Masterpiece Cakeshop. This Court’s decision in Bostock
adds force to the race analogy by its clear directive to
privilege the plain language of a statute.84 The plain
language of the FPO unambiguously lists sexual orientation alongside race as equally within the statute’s
protections. The discriminatory conduct proscribed by
the FPO is equally prohibited regardless of whether a
Black, heterosexual couple is turned away from a restaurant or whether a white, same-sex couple is turned
away by CSS. Because the statute’s plain language is
a straightforward command not to discriminate that
creates no hierarchy of protections, discriminating
based on sexual orientation is “just as intolerable as
discrimination directed toward race, national origin,
or religion.”85 “That intolerance of discrimination is not
84

Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1749.
Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 79–80 (N.M.
2013) (Bosson, J., concurring) (rejecting a wedding photographer’s request for a religious exemption from the New Mexico
85
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unreasonable and unwarranted.”86 As in Bostock, because “the meaning of the statute’s terms is plain, [a
court’s] job is at an end.”87
Moreover, the principle behind antidiscrimination
laws supports use of the race analogy in sexual orientation religious exemption cases. The goal of public accommodation laws is to preclude the perpetuation of
unequal status hierarchies through discrimination in
the marketplace. While all individuals are protected
from the specified forms of discrimination, including
LGBT people and people of color, the groups in the current dispute and in the case law are similarly situated:
the statute’s plain language protects these groups
who are vulnerable to invidious discrimination in the
public square.88 Although the historical, cultural, and
political reasons for vulnerability to discrimination in
the marketplace vary, the harms against which the
statute seeks to protect is similar enough to support
the analogy in this context—the stigmatic and economic harm of discrimination in public accommodation.89

public accommodation law that would allow the photographer to
turn away same-sex couples).
86
MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT?, supra note 10, at 154.
87
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1749.
88
Sager & Tebbe, supra note 49, at 173 (“The central aim of
civil rights law is to protect members of vulnerable groups from
the harms of structural injustice; that vital project would be undermined by a broad carve out for religious dissent.”).
89
See Russell, supra note 35, at 44; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 625.
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Because public accommodation law “does not take
sides in a purported culture war”90 but instead “stipulates what citizens who are divided on questions of
profound importance nonetheless owe to each other in
order to live together as equals in our political community[,]”91 a statute’s unambiguous inclusion of both
race and sexual orientation in a civil rights law renders analogies to race proper. The Court itself has
declared that a state legislature’s decision to include
LGBT people within its laws is a decision that the
Court and the Constitution should recognize and uphold.92
In fact, this Court has analogized to race when
analyzing a sex discrimination claim under federal
antidiscrimination law that included both race and sex
as protected classes. In City of Los Angeles v. Manhart,
the Court faced a class-action challenge made by
women alleging that the Department of Water and
Power’s requirement that female employees make
larger contributions to its pension fund than male
employees violated Title VII.93 While Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment and the FPO prohibits discrimination in public accommodation, both
90

Sager & Tebbe, supra note 49, at 173.
Id. at 173–74.
92
See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 768 (emphasizing that New
York’s recognition of same-sex marriages was a proper use of its
“historic and essential authority to define the marital relation in
this way” and that this legislative decision “enhanced the recognition, dignity, and protection of the class in their own community”).
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435 U.S. 702, 704–05 (1978).
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statutes similarly enumerate numerous forms of discrimination addressed by their protections—“race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin”94 for Title VII and
“race, ethnicity, color, sex, sexual orientation, gender
identity, religion, national origin, ancestry, disability,
marital status, familial status, or domestic or sexual
violence victim status”95 for the FPO.
The Manhart Court used the race analogy to support its decision that the city’s requirement was sexbased discrimination in violation of Title VII: “Congress
has decided that classifications based on sex, like
those based on national origin or race, are unlawful.”96
Because the Court found that the city’s pension rule
would not be permissible as to race, it reasoned by
analogy that it was not permissible as to sex.97 That
the Court was comfortable with finding what might
be termed “statutory sameness” between race and sex
should dictate that the “statutory sameness” between
sexual orientation and race is compelling in the present
case. This is particularly true after Bostock: Because bans
on sex-based discrimination ban sexual orientation-based
discrimination, and because the Court analogizes race
to sex, the Court therefore should analogize race to
sexual orientation. After Bostock, then, there is a
clear through-line from the acceptance of the sex-race
94

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Philadelphia Code § 9-1106.
96
435 U.S. at 709.
97
Id. (“But a statute that was designed to make race irrelevant in the employment market could not reasonably be construed to permit a take-home-pay differential based on a racial
classification.”) (citation omitted).
95
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analogy in both Manhart and Jaycees, to the subsuming of sexual orientation discrimination under sex discrimination in Bostock, to the sexual orientation-race
analogy supporting the Respondents here.
The race analogy is thus appropriate in the context of public accommodation statutes. To allow any
other result would create incoherence in the law, disregard the FPO’s plain language, and send a normative
message that discrimination against LGBT consumers
is natural, normal, and acceptable.98
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

CONCLUSION
This country and this Court have considered and
rejected claims for religious exemptions from public
accommodation laws in similar contexts to the claims
asserted by today’s exemption seekers. We do not need
“new and expansive accommodations that depart significantly from the ways in which the nation has in the
past accommodated liberty considerations while seeking to attain equality objectives in the context of race
and gender.”99 This Court should look to what worked
historically when similar challenges to antidiscrimination laws—in the context of race and sex—have been
raised.100 Analogizing to race in the present dispute
98

See Tebbe, supra note 40, at 61–62.
Ball, supra note 3, at 238.
100
Id. at 245 (“In other words, there is no need to reinvent
the exemption wheel. The bottom line is this: we should be suspicious of the contention that the push for LGBT rights, in particular as it relates to marriage equality, constitutes a unique threat
to religious liberty that requires significant departures from the
99
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requires no improper governmental assessment of religious beliefs, just as courts made no such assessment
in the 1960s. The race analogy, including an analogy
to Piggie Park, should be used today and would not
require an inquiry into Petitioners’ sincerely held religious beliefs.
Respectfully submitted,
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